The interplay between public and private actors in the exploitation of natural resources in an occupied territory makes the regime of state and individual responsibility particularly complex in cases of exploitation by private actors that result in breach of international humanitarian law. The Occupying Power has the duty not to deplete the natural resources of the occupied territory and, according to the case law of the International Court of Justice, it must also ensure that private actors do not exploit the natural resources of the occupied territory in violation of international humanitarian law. This paper explores the legal basis of this duty of vigilance and the consequences of the Occupying Power's responsibility for the acts of private actors.
Introduction
The law of belligerent occupation has received significant academic attention in recent decades. 1 This essay explores the interplay between public (the Occupying Power) and private (eg companies and corporations) actors in the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory.
In particular, it focuses on the Occupying Power's international responsibility for acts of exploitation of natural resources in violation of international humanitarian law that are committed by private actors, with attention also to the relevant issues of individual criminal liability. For the purposes of this essay, the expression 'illegal exploitation' refers to exploitation of natural resources in violation of international humanitarian law only.
This essay does not specifically address the related topic of the accountability of corporations and companies for the exploitation of natural resources under international human rights law, 2 nor does it examine international human rights law obligations incumbent upon the Occupying Power. 3 Suffice it to say that it is well established that the Occupying Power must comply with the rules of international human rights law when it acts in the occupied territory, 4 and the rules regarding property, economic, and social rights are extremely relevant for the exploitation of natural resources. 5 The subject of the exploitation of natural resources in armed conflict 6 and, specifically, in times of belligerent occupation, 7 has been studied extensively by scholars. However, state responsibility for violations committed by private actors has not been explored in depth from an international humanitarian law perspective; this is quite strange since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has discussed this issue in the case of the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda Kolb, Vité (2009) ; Koutroulis (2010) ; Annoni (2012) ; Carcano (2015) ; . 2 On the accountability of companies and corporations for human rights violations, see, among many others, De Schutter (2006) ; Bonfanti (2012); . 3 See, among others, Wilde (2009); Lubell (2012); Ferraro (2013) . 4 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 126, para. 106 (Wall opinion); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para. 216. 5 With specific regard to the role of international human rights law in the exploitation of natural resources in times of occupation, see Scobbie (2011) . 6 See eg Okowa (2007) ; Tignino Pertile (2013) ; Dam-de Jong (2015) . 7 See eg Cassese (1992) ; Scobbie (1997) ; Benvenisti (2003) ; Longobardo (2015) . 8 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4 . On the Court's findings regarding the exploitation of natural resources, see Cervell Hortal (2006) ; Dufresne (2008) ; Cimiotta (2011). This paper attempts to fill the void in scholarship surrounding state responsibility by focusing on the narrow context of state responsibility for private actors exploiting natural resources. Accordingly, this paper begins by analysing the rules concerning the exploitation of natural resources in times of belligerent occupation. The paper goes on to test the rules on international responsibility for such exploitative activity in order to verify whether acts of private actors are attributable to the Occupying Power. Moreover, this paper considers the merits of the existence of a duty to prevent private actors from illegally exploiting natural resources in the occupied territory.
The paper also draws some conclusions regarding the consequence of acts of exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory as a matter of individual criminal responsibility of both state organs and private actors.
The Relationship Between the Occupying Power and Natural Resources in the Occupied Territory
The law of belligerent occupation is codified in the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR), 9 in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (IV GC), 10 and in the 1977 First Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I). 11 It is well established that the rules embodied in the HR and in the IV GC reflect general international law, 12 while only some AP I provisions enjoy customary status. 13 Belligerent occupation is effective control of territory gained during an armed conflict and without the consent of the sovereign of that territory. 14 According to Article 42 HR, which reflects customary international law, 15 '[t] erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.' Accordingly, the law of belligerent occupation applies irrespectively of the fact that the Occupying Power declares the territory to be occupied or contests this assumption. 12 Wall opinion, supra n. 4, para. 89; Meron (1987) . 13 Roberts (1990), p. 54; Dinstein (2009), pp. 7-8 . For the identification of customary international humanitarian law rules is extremely helpful the study by Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (2005) vol. I. 14 See DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 173. See also Roberts (1985) pp. 251-252; Benvenisti (2012), p. 3. 15 Wall opinion, supra n. 4, para. 78; DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 172. 16 Greenwood (1992), p. 250. During belligerent occupations, there is a divide between sovereignty, which is vested in the ousted government or in the population of the occupied territory, and the Occupying Power's temporary responsibility for governmental functions. The Occupying Power -notwithstanding its exercise of powers and functions that are similar to those that were exercised by the ousted sovereign before the occupation -does not acquire sovereignty over the occupied territory since the evolution of international law, particularly the emergence of the principle of self-determination of peoples and the ban on the use of force, prevents the Occupying Power from conquering the territory it occupies. 17 Several international humanitarian law provisions exclude acquisition of sovereignty by the Occupying Power. According to Article 43 HR, the Occupying Power has to respect, unless absolutely prevented from doing so, the law in force in the occupied territory. 18 Moreover, Article 47 IV GC prescribes that protected persons in the occupied territory enjoy the rights embodied in the convention notwithstanding any change introduced in the territory and any annexation. Finally, Article 4 AP I unequivocally affirms that the occupation of a territory does not affect its legal status.
Breaking the normal parallelism between exercise of governmental functions and legal entitlement to do so, belligerent occupation appears to be a state of exception in international relations. 19 Thus, it is a necessarily temporary situation that may end only with the restitution of the territory to the ousted sovereign or an act of volition of the ousted sovereign that confers on the Occupying Power legal title to the territory. 20 Accordingly, even if prolonged occupations occur, they inevitably must terminate sooner or later. 21 These principles are reflected in the international humanitarian law provisions regarding the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory. Natural resources can be categorised as either public or private property depending on the domestic law of the occupied territory in force before the beginning of the occupation. 22 On the basis of the private or public nature of the property, different international rules apply.
With regard to natural resources that are public property, according to Article 55 HR the Occupying Power is 'administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and 17 See Affaire de la Dette Publique Ottomane (Bulgaria, Irak, Palestine, Transjordan, Greece, Italy and Turkey [1925] RIAA 529, p. 555. See also Pellet (1992), pp. 244-245; Korman (1996), pp. 218-230; Dinstein (2009) , pp. 49-52. Accordingly, the ECJ refused to qualify as 'made in Israel' products manufactured by companies located in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ECJ, Case C-386/08, 25 February 2010; for a commentary, see Fornari (2013) ). 18 For more on this provision, see Section 4.3.2. 19 See Benvenisti (2012), p. vii; Ben-Naftali (2012) ; Bothe (2015 Bothe ( ), p. 1460 Greenwood (1992), pp. 244-245; Ben-Naftali (2012), p. 546. 21 On the difference between the expressions 'temporary' and 'lasting only a short time', see Koutroulis (2012) , p. 167. On prolonged occupation, see generally Roberts (1990); Scobbie (2015) . 22 Van den Herik, Dam-de Jong (2011), p. 252; Bothe (2015 Bothe ( ), p. 1477 agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State'. This provision clearly reinforces the idea that the Occupying Power does not acquire sovereignty over the occupied territory. 23 However, the Occupying Power may legitimately take possessions of movable natural resources if they may be used for military operations pursuant to Article 53 HR. 24 Although these provisions refer only to natural resources owned by the ousted sovereign, the provision of Article 47 HR forbidding pillaging 25 pertains to the appropriation of both private and public property. 26 In addition, Article 46 HR specifically protects private property, and this provision also covers private natural resources that are owned by individuals. 27 Privately owned war materials may be seized pursuant to Article 53(2) HR, but they must be restored or compensated at the end of the occupation. Moreover, Article 52 HR regarding requisitions and contributions is sometimes mentioned in order to affirm that exploitation of natural resources owned by private parties is admissible if required by the need of the occupying army. 28 One can conclude that the Occupying Power is not absolutely precluded from exploiting natural resources in the occupied territory. Rather, it may lawfully sustain its own occupation thanks to the exploitation of natural resources located in the occupied territory. However, since the Occupying Power does not have sovereignty over the occupied territory and the occupation is a temporary situation, 29 the Occupying Power must not deplete the natural resources in the occupied territory, as the territory itself must be returned to the ousted sovereign at the end of the occupation. Forces et al., 26 December 2011 (Yesh Din case) , unofficial English translation at www.hamoked.org/images/psak.pdf. In the same decision, the Court held that the prolonged nature of the occupation allows a more flexible interpretation of Article 43 regarding the exploitation of natural resources (ibid., paras. 9-13). It is not possible to analyse here the Court's reasoning regarding this issue, which has been strongly criticized by several scholars (see eg Kratzmer (2012), pp. 220-222; Pace (2012) Scobbie (1997), pp. 228-231; Bothe (2015) , p. 1477. 28 See Scobbie (1997), pp. 228-231 . 29 See, eg US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, In re Krupp (1948) 15 AD 620, p. 622: '[I] f as a result of war action, a belligerent occupies a territory of the adversary, he does not, thereby, acquire the right to dispose of property in that territory, except according to the strict rules laid down in the Regulations.'
This conclusion is consistent with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, a norm which is both part of customary international law 31 Arai-Takahashi (2009), pp. 209-210; Dinstein (2009), p. 215; Benvenisti (2003), pp. 869-870; Bothe (2015 Bothe ( ), p. 1477 Van Engeland (2015 ), p. 1544 . On this principle, see generally Brownlie (1979); Schrijver (1997); Bungenberg, Howe (2015) . 32 See Sassòli (2002); Fleck (2006) . The relevance of the law of international responsibility in times of occupation is specifically noted by The rules embodied in the HR -provisions regarding the exploitation of natural resources included -were drafted from an inter-state perspective, and they were meant to address behaviours of the armed forces of the belligerents. Members of the armed forces are de jure state organs and, accordingly, pursuant to the Draft Articles, the Occupying Power is internationally responsible for illegal exploitation committed by the commander of the occupied area and by every member of the occupying forces since their acts are automatically attributable to the Occupying Power. 40 In the words of the ICJ, '[t]he conduct of the [Uganda People's Defence Force] as a whole is clearly attributable to Uganda, being the conduct of a State organ. According to a well-established rule of international law, which is of customary character, "the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of that State"' 41 However, one has to note that the attribution of acts committed by members of the armed forces is slightly different from the ordinary regime: while the conduct of a state organ is attributable to the state only if it acts in its official capacity, 42 the ICJ considered that every act committed by a member of the armed forces is attributable to the state pursuant to Article 3 of the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention and Article 91 AP I. 43 Accordingly, it is not relevant whether the organ acted privately or officially in order to trigger state responsibility.
Moreover, a wrongful act is attributable to a state if it is committed by individuals directed or controlled by the state, and by individuals whose conduct is acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own. 44 In these cases, the individuals are usually qualified as de facto state organs. 45 Accordingly, acts of illegal exploitation committed by de jure or de facto organs of the Occupying Power trigger state responsibility on the basis of their attribution to the state. On the other hand, the same individuals -irrespective of their qualification as state organs -may face international criminal prosecution for their acts of illegal exploitation.
In this regard, even if international criminal law does not address directly the protection of natural resources, several scholars argue that the war crime of pillaging pursuant to Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) may apply to acts of illegal exploitation. 46 The International Criminal Court has not had the chance to pass judgment 39 On the issue of attribution, see, among others, Condorelli (1984) . 40 See Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n. 38, Articles 4, 7. 41 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 213. 42 See Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n. 38, p. 42, and the international case law mentioned therein. 43 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 214. 44 Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n. 38, Articles 8, 11. 45 See generally Palchetti (2007); Palchetti (2012) . 46 See eg Stewart (2010) ; Lundberg (2008) ; Keenan (2014); Tiwari (2016) . on this issue yet; however, from the ICC Statute and the Elements of Crimes it is plausible that unlawful exploitation of natural resources in times of occupation may amount to the war crime of pillaging 47 -an idea recently supported by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor. 48 Indeed, even if the ICC Statute provisions regarding pillage were drafted with personal belongings and movable properties in mind, the ICJ affirmed clearly that plundering natural resources in the occupied territory amounts to pillaging. 49 Moreover, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, pillage may refer also to 'the seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a systemic economic exploitation of occupied territory'. 50 Finally, there is a consistency between the fact that the exploitation of natural resources is lawful if justified by military operations and that the war crime of pillaging only encompasses appropriation for private or personal purposes.
In brief, with respect to illegal exploitation committed by de jure or de facto state organs, the Occupying Power may be held responsible for the violations of the international humanitarian rules regarding the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory; the same state organs, individually, may be prosecuted for the war crime of pillaging.
State and Individual Responsibility for Acts of Illegal Exploitation Committed by Private Actors in the Occupied Territory

Introductory Remarks
The concept of a de facto state organ does not encompass individuals who act without any link to a state. Such individuals are commonly referred to as private actors.
In times of belligerent occupation, it happens that private actors that are not organs of the Occupying Power exploit the natural resources in the occupied territory. For instance, during the Ugandan occupation of the Ituri region in DRC, the exploitation of the local natural resources was undertaken by both members of the Ugandan armed forces and private businessmen and 47 Van den Herik Dam-de Jong (2011), pp. 272-273 . For a discussion of the possibility of punishing illegal exploitation of natural resources under different war crime definitions, see ibid, pp. 256-261. 48 Because of the involvement of private actors in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory, it is necessary to explore whether the Occupying Power is internationally responsible for such illegal exploitation as a matter of international humanitarian law, and the relevant issues regarding individual criminal responsibility.
One should note that, as a matter of international human rights law, the Occupying Power has the duty to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights in the occupied territory. In international human rights law, 'protect' means that a state must prevent and punish interference with human rights that are committed by third parties. The case law of international courts and tribunals is well established on this point. 53 With regard to the activities of companies in light of international humanitarian law, the situation is more uncertain. 54 Therefore, it is necessary to explore the law of belligerent occupation and the law of state responsibility in order to find out whether private acts in violation of international humanitarian law involve the responsibility of the Occupying Power. At least two main options could be examined. First, it may be argued that the Occupying Power is responsible for having tolerated such acts in the territory under its control. In this case, the Occupying Power would be considered directly responsible for the violations of the relevant international humanitarian law rules.
Grounds for the Occupying Power's Responsibility for Illegal Exploitation Committed by Private Actors
Occupying Power's Direct Responsibility for Acts of Illegal Exploitation
This conclusion could be drawn by applying to the instant issue the theory that Hugo Grotius formulated regarding state responsibility for acts of private actors committed within the boundaries of a state. According to Grotius, in these cases, a State (rectius: the King) may be held directly responsible for having violated international law only if it has not punished the perpetrators due to its own culpa, 55 since it has tolerated (patientia) and thus, accepted (receptus) the acts of private actors located in its territory. 56 On this basis, more recent authors have developed the so-called 'theory of complicity', according to which a state is directly responsible for acts of private actors if it fails to prosecute them. 57 Grotius' theory and its developments have the advantage of immediately allocating responsibility for a breach of international law to a state, which is the subject of international law par excellence. However, in the case of the Occupying Power's responsibility, it would be considered responsible for an international wrongful act -the illegal exploitation of natural resources -that is not attributable on the basis of the customary rules on international responsibility codified in the Draft Articles.
In the alternative, one might argue that a special secondary rule 58 on attribution of the conduct of private actors during belligerent occupation exists in international customary law and that it prevails as lex specialis on the rules codified in the International Law Commission on the basis of Article 55 Draft Articles. However, such a rule in not embodied in any international humanitarian law convention, nor is there any relevant opinio juris and state practice on its existence qua customary law. Accordingly, the view of the Occupying Power being directly responsible for acts of private actors should be considered out of line with contemporary international law.
Occupying Power's Direct Responsibility for Not Having Prevented Acts of Illegal Exploitation
55 Grotius (1964) Second, it is possible to shift the attention from secondary rules regarding the attribution of wrongful acts to states to the field of the relevant primary rules. In fact, the law of international responsibility considers that a state may be held responsible for the conduct of private persons only if it has assumed the role of guarantor for certain conduct or events to either happen or not happen.
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In cases of private actors violating the rules pertaining to the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory, there is room to argue that the Occupying Power is not responsible for the violations of the aforementioned conventional rules of jus in bello. On the contrary, the Occupying Power may be considered responsible for the violation of an autonomous and different rule, whose content is the duty to prevent private actors from violating international humanitarian law.
This second option has a notable advantage. It considers the Occupying Powers to be internationally responsible only for conduct that is attributable to it on the basis of the law of international responsibility.
Accordingly, one has to find such primary rule concerned with the Occupying Power's duty to prevent international humanitarian law violations committed by private articles. The problem is that there is not a specific provision regarding the Occupying Power's duty to prevent private actors' illegal exploitation in the international humanitarian law conventions. However, this duty can be inferred from more general provisions. In this regard, at least two options are available.
In Search of an Autonomous Duty to Prevent Private Actors from Violating International
Humanitarian Law in the Occupied Territory
Article 1 Common to the Four Geneva Conventions
First, one could consider that Article 1 common to the Four Geneva Conventions (common In some scholars' opinions, the duty to ensure respect for the Conventions pursuant to common Article 1 is also related to the acts of private actors that are under the authority of one of the contracting states. 62 This interpretation is supported by the travaux preparatoires, 63 by some military manuals, 64 and by the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 65 Accordingly, the Occupying Power is under a duty of due diligence, which is an obligation of conduct, regarding private actors violations, on the basis of common Article 1. 66 In evaluating this option, however, one should take into account some factors that, without entirely excluding this view's soundness, shed some doubts on its actual relevance in cases of occupation. First, the text of common Article 1 specifically refers only to the obligations embodied in the Four Geneva Conventions, while the rules regarding the exploitation of natural resources are codified in the HR. Only according to one author does the obligation to ensure respect explicitly regard rules embodied in the HR; 67 this author refers to the International Committee of the Red Cross' study on customary international humanitarian law that prescribes a duty to ensure respect only with regards to acts of members of the armed forces and other persons or groups acting on a belligerent's instructions, or under its direction or control. 68 This reference is not relevant since, as mentioned afore, these individuals fall into the definition of de facto organs, while in the case at hand, the acts are committed by private actors. Moreover, since they are state organs -even if de facto rather than de jure -their conduct fall under the state's duty to respect the Geneva Conventions, rather than under the duty to ensure respect.
Second, the application of common Article 1 to private actors' conduct is not mentioned in international case law. For instance, the ICJ has invoked the duty to ensure respect pursuant to common Article 1 mainly in order to emphasise the erga omnes / erga omnes partes character of the duties embodied in the Four Geneva Conventions. 69 In these same occasions, the ICJ never mentioned that such a duty exists with respect to the HR. Moreover, the ICJ did not mention common Article 1 in dealing with acts of illegal exploitation committed by private actors in the occupied territory. 70 As I will argue in the subsection below, there is a provision dealing only with private actors' conduct in occupied territory, rather than in every circumstances -Article 43 HR. Accordingly, Article 43 HR should be regarded as the source of the Occupying Power's duty since it is a provision more specifically pertaining to belligerent occupation -and, thus, it should be applied instead of the concurring provision of common Article 1 as a matter of lex specialis. However, this conclusion does not impair the relevance of common Article 1 with respect of private actors' conduct in breach of international humanitarian law; rather, common Article 1 is a less correct source of duties regarding private actors than Article 43 HR, which applies only in the specific circumstance of belligerent occupation.
Article 43 HR
Article 43 HR is the most important provision regarding the duties and rights of the Occupying
Power, a sort of legal framework in which every specific provision pertaining to the administration of the occupied territory finds its justification. 71 The Occupying Power must comply with the duties embodied in Article 43 HR even if it chooses not to establish a formally structured administration in the occupied territory. 72 Article 64 IV GC complements article 43 HR. 73 According to Article 43 HR, the Occupying Power 'shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and [civil life], while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.' 74 Consequently, Article 43 HR could be read as the source of the Occupying Power's duty to prevent private actors from illegally exploiting natural resources.
Article 43 HR is comprised of a set of obligations that are the core objectives of the administration of the occupied territory. These duties include the duty to restore and ensure public order, which encompasses 'responsibility for preserving order, punishing crime, and protecting lives and property within the occupied territory', 75 the duty to restore and ensure civil life, which encompasses the 'whole social, commercial and economic life of the community' 76 , and 'a variety of aspects of civil life, such as the economy, society, education, welfare, health, [and] transport ', 77 as well as the duty to respect, sauf empêchement absolu, the laws in force in the territory -an obligation that pertains to the way in which the Occupying Power has to implement its duties to restore and ensure public order and civil life, as demonstrated by the text itself of Article 43 HR ('while respecting. . .' and 'en respectant. . .'). This last duty to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory is relevant for the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory since the Occupying Power may not lawfully pass new legislation in order to enable private actors to exploit the natural resources in the occupied territory. Consequently, new contracts may be concluded only as long as they are based on the law in force before the beginning of the occupation, and are not valid after the end of the occupation since they should be seen as the product of the will of the Occupying Power. 78 However, it is submitted here that Article 43 HR contains yet another obligation regarding the duty to prevent private actors from illegally exploiting natural resources. This duty is not written in the text of the provision, but it can be construed through implications.
Article 43 HR puts forward the aims and the duties of the Occupying Power's administration in broader terms. Along with this provision, the law of belligerent occupation embodies a number of specific provisions that limit the Occupying Power's discretion regarding its administration. It would be illogical to contend on the one hand that the Occupying Power is prevented from taking certain actions, while arguing on the other hand that it may lawfully tolerate private actors committing the same actions themselves. Moreover, such a self-contradictory argument would be in contrast with the principles of effectiveness and good faith that are relevant for the interpretation of any treaty provision, the international humanitarian law conventions included. 79 Article 43 HR is an adequate source of the Occupying Power's duty to prevent private actors from violating international humanitarian law as it regulates in general terms the duties and rights that are consequences of the belligerent occupation. In other words, Article 43 HR is the tool 75 through which international law imposes some obligations on a state due to its effective control over a portion of territory. However, it also burdens the Occupying Power with the responsibilities to restore and ensure public order and civil life, and these obligations may not be fulfilled if the Occupying Power allows private actors to violate international humanitarian law.
Furthermore, if new legislation is required in order to issue concessions and contracts regarding the exploitation of natural resources, the duty not to pass new legislation in violation of the law in force in the occupied territory prevents the Occupying Power from explicitly allowing private actors' acts of exploitation. 80 In these circumstances, every exploitation carried out with the consent of the Occupying Power would be pursuant to Article 43 HR, while every exploitation conducted without such a legislative authorisation would be devoid of any legal basis -and thus it should be repressed by the Occupying Power pursuant to its duty to maintain order in the occupied territory. 81 State practice and international case law confirms that Article 43 HR is the source of a duty of vigilance regarding the violations of international humanitarian law by private actors. According to the US Law of War Manual, '[t] he Occupying Power has a general duty to maintain public order and to provide for the preservation of rights of the inhabitants, including rights to their private property.' 82 In the framework of Article 43 HR, this conclusion does not mean the Occupying Power has to refrain from violating individuals' property rights -a matter discussed in another section of the US Law of War Manual; 83 rather, it refers to the duty of vigilance of the Occupying Power with regard to private property, as affirmed by relevant national and international case law. 84 Clearly, this duty pertains to the protection of private property pursuant to the law in force in the occupied territory before the occupation. However, it can be read as pertaining to the protection of both public and private property pursuant to international humanitarian law as well. To this regard, the US Law of War Manual itself openly acknowledge that '[m]litary occupation of enemy territory 80 It is noteworthy that the Republic of Azerbaijan, which considers the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to be occupied by Armenia, affirms that exploitation of natural resources in the area is illegal also because Armenia does not comply with the Azerbaijani laws regarding permission and licenses, which are allegedly covered by Article 43 HR (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Illegal Economic and Other Activities in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan (2016) pp. 91-92, www.mfa.gov.az/files/file/MFA_Report_on_the_occupied_territories_March_2016_1.pdf). On the controversial issue regarding the qualification of Nagorno-Karabakh as occupied territory, see Ronzitti (2014), pp. 39-42. 81 Obviously, contracts concluded and licenses issued before the beginning of the occupation may be implemented, since they are based on the law in force in the occupied territory before the occupation. See Bekker (2003) . 82 US Department of Defence, supra n. 78, section 11.5. 83 Ibid., section 11.18. 84 See Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 159 (1913) : 'The protocol of August 12, 1898 (30 Stat. 1742 […] left our Government, by its military forces, in the occupation and control of Porto Rico as a colony of Spain, and bound by the principles of international law to do whatever was necessary to secure public safety, social order, and the guaranties of private property.' See also US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, supra n. 75, p. 652. involves a complicated, trilateral set of legal relations between the Occupying Power, the temporarily ousted sovereign authority, and the inhabitants of occupied territory.' 85 As to the international case law supporting the existence of such a duty of vigilance regarding private actors' acts in breach of international humanitarian law, first, one has to mention the findings of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, according to which:
Whether or not Ethiopian military personnel were directly involved in the looting and stripping of buildings in the town, Ethiopia, as the Occupying Power, was responsible for the maintenance of public order, for respecting private property, and for preventing pillage.
Consequently, Ethiopia is liable for permitting the unlawful looting and stripping of buildings in the town during the period of its occupation. 86 Although this paragraph refers to destruction and seizure of private property, it is extremely relevant in the framework of private actors' illegal exploitation of natural resources for several reasons. First, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission bases the Occupying Power's responsibility on duties embodied in Article 43 HR combined with the specific international humanitarian law provisions regarding private property in occupied territory. 87 In this case, Article 43 HR is the basis for the Occupying Power's duty to prevent the commission of that same conduct that it may not carry out directly pursuant to the law of occupation. Second, this duty is inherent to the situation of occupation since 'Ethiopia is not liable for damages [that] . . . occurred either before or after its occupation of the town.' 88 Third, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commision's reasoning is applicable to other conduct that is per se prohibited to the Occupying Power, and that the Occupying Power must prevent private actors from performing pursuant to Article 43 HR; this last consideration is also supported by the fact that the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission's dictum regarded pillage, a word that is today commonly construed as pertaining also to the illegal exploitation of natural resources. 89 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission's conclusion regarding a duty of prevention incumbent upon the Occupying Power pertaining to the conduct of private actors was authoritatively confirmed a year later by the ICJ. In the DRC v Uganda case, the ICJ considered that Article 43 HR is the source of the Occupying Power's obligation regarding private actors:
85 US Department of Defence, supra n. 78, section 11.4. 86 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Central Front -Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 28 April 2004, para. 67 (emphasis added) . 87 Ibid., fn 29: 'Hague Regulations, supra note 15, at arts. 43, 46, 47.' 88 Ibid., para. 67. 89 See supra section 3.
Uganda was under an obligation, according to Art. 43 HR, to take all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area .
. . This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any third party. 90 Correctly, and in accordance with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission's case law, the ICJ emphasised that this duty regarding private actors' activity is typical of the situation of belligerent occupation. In the ICJ's own words, . This conclusion is consistent with the nature of belligerent occupation, a situation in which governmental functions are exercised on the basis of de facto control over a territory, rather than a legal title. The duty incumbent upon the Occupying Power is similar to states' obligation not to allow private actors under their jurisdiction to use their territory in order to cause harm to other states. 93 In the instant case, the Occupying Power has to prevent private actors under its jurisdiction from doing harm to another state, that is the sovereign of the occupied territory that has been temporally ousted, but which retains its rights in relation to that territory, integrity of its natural resources included. As affirmed by the ICJ, the absence of a legal title over the territory is irrelevant 90 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 158. See also para. 250. 91 Ibid, para. 248. 92 for the instant issue, since 'physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States'. 94 This is particularly true in times of belligerent occupation, when the Occupying Power, thanks to its factual and effective control over the territory, has the duty to exercises governmental functions in order to restore and ensure public order and civil life pursuant to Article 43 HR. 95 When such control is not effective, it is more difficult to identify a duty of vigilance in armed conflict. 96 For these reasons, Article 43 HR is better suited to be considered the source of the Occupying Power's duty to prevent private actors' violations of international humanitarian law.
Nature and Scope of the Duty of Vigilance Against Private Actors' Violations of International Humanitarian Law
According to the ICJ, the Occupying Power's duty regarding illegal exploitation carried out by private actors is a duty of vigilance. 97 In other words, the Occupying Power's responsibility is a consequence of the violation of a primary rule -Article 43 HR or, less convincingly, common Article 1 -but it is triggered by private actors' activities that are in conflict with the international humanitarian law provisions regarding exploitation of natural resources. 98 This kind of obligation encompasses two related duties: the duty of vigilance and the duty to punish private actors' violations if they occur. 99 The Occupying Power can punish those private actors through the judicial system of the occupied territory and its own military courts. 100 94 Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971 ] ICJ Rep 16, para. 118. See also Lozano Contreras (2006 . 95 See Haupais (2007), pp. 131-133 . Mutatis mutandis, this was the conclusion regarding the duty of the Occupying Power to prevent acts of terrorism envisaged by Condorelli (1989), pp. 240-241 . 96 See eg the problem regarding corporations financing internal conflicts through the exploitation of natural resources, explored by Pertile (2016) , pp. 400-406. 97 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 179: '. . . Uganda's responsibility is engaged both for any acts of its military that violated its international obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory . . .' (emphasis added). 98 See, from a more general perspective, the remarks of the International Law Commission in the Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n. 38, p. 39, para. 4: '. . . a State is not responsible, as such, for the acts of private individuals in seizing an embassy, but it will be responsible if it fails to take all the necessary steps to protect the embassy from seizure, or to regain control over it. . . . [T] here is often a close link between the basis of attribution and the particular obligation to have been breached, even though the two elements are analytically distinct. ' See also Pisillo Mazzeschi (1992) 100 For an overview of the judicial system in the occupied territory, see Arai-Takahashi (2015) , pp. 1429-1436.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
The duty of vigilance pursuant to Article 43 HR is a duty of conduct, rather than a duty of result. According to some authors, every obligation in Article 43 HR is an obligation of conduct. 101 Roberto Ago introduced the distinction between obligations of conduct (or of means) and of result in the work of the International Law Commission regarding state responsibility; according to Ago, an obligation of conduct demands a state to achieve a certain result and specify the means through which the state must attain that result. 102 Ago's definition does not correspond to what civil law systems consider an obligation of conduct, and so it was not included in the final Draft Articles and is considered incorrect by the majority of publicists. 103 On the basis of the concept elaborated by civil law traditions, today, an obligation of conduct require states 'to deploy adequate means, to do the outmost, to obtain [a] result'. 104 The main character of obligations of conduct is that a state under such an obligation is not automatically responsible if an event in violation of its obligation occurs; on the contrary, the state may demonstrate that it has endeavoured to prevent that violation, and, thus, it does not incur international responsibility. 105 However, this does not mean that the state's behaviour and choices may not be contested before a competent court; 106 rather, the state that failed to perform adequate prevention and vigilance may avoid its international responsibility if it demonstrates that its behaviour was characterised by due diligence. 107 The assessment of due diligence is not easy, 108 and must be conducted in concreto, 109 on the basis of several factors such as the degree of control of the state (rectius: the Occupying Power), the importance of the interest to be protected in the specific situation, the degree of predictability of the violation, and the degree of risk involved. 110 In other words, the Occupying Power has to adopt all the 'reasonably appropriate' 111 measures at its disposal pursuant to the law of occupation in order to ensure private actors' respect for international humanitarian law. Accordingly, the Occupying Power is released from responsibility if it demonstrates that it has carried out a diligent policy of vigilance over and punishment of private actors' illegal exploitation of natural resources.
Consequences in Terms of Individual Criminal Responsibility
In cases of illegal exploitation committed by private actors, they are the only individuals that may possibly be prosecuted for the war crime of pillaging if their behavior falls into the definition of this crime and the relevant conditions for the prosecution are met. 112 The organs of the Occupying Power who failed in their vigilance -even showing a lack of due diligence -are not to be prosecuted since they themselves have not violated the international humanitarian law rules regarding the exploitation of natural resources. They only violated a duty embodied in Article 43 HR, whose breach, however serious, does not constitute a war crime under the ICC Statute. Accordingly, those state organs may not be individually prosecuted at the international level, although their behavior is able to trigger state responsibility.
Moreover, their individual criminal responsibility is excluded under Article 28 ICC Statute regarding responsibility of commanders and other superiors. It is true that, according to treaty and customary law, commanders and superiors may be held responsible for not having prevented and punished war crimes committed by their subordinates. 113 However, private actors illegally exploiting natural resources in the occupied territory are not considered subordinates of the military commander of the area -meaning that they would be de facto organs rather than private actors.
Conversely, Article 28 ICC Statute requires a legal or factual hierarchical relationship between the commander(s) and the perpetrator(s) of the crime(s), a requirement that is not present in case of illegal exploitation of natural resources by private actors. 114 More generally, belligerent occupation is control over territory, not control over individuals. Accordingly, one may not claim that the occupation implies such an obtrusive control over every individual dwelling in the area and that they are all subordinates of the military commander. The Occupying Power's control is similar to the control exercised by a state over its own territory, and 111 Responsibilities, supra n. 104, para. 120. 112 See Section 3. 113 See Article 87 AP I; rule 153 in Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (2005) vol. I, pp. 558-563. 114 supra n. 26, . This paper is not the proper occasion for discussing command and superior responsibility. For more on this topic, see Triffterer, Arnold (2016) , pp. 1091-1094, and the case law cited therein. state officials are not considered automatically commanders or superiors of every individual under their jurisdiction. A different conclusion would turn the Occupying Power's obligation of conduct into an obligation of result for the purposes of international criminal law.
In light of the above, when acts of illegal exploitation are committed by private actors, the Occupying Power may be held responsible for not having diligently prevented them, but only the private actors -and not state organs -may be prosecuted for the international crimes. 115
Conclusive Remarks
The interplay between public and private actors in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory is the source of a number of complex issues related to international state responsibility and individual criminal liability.
The correct identification of the relevant international norms applicable to the illegal exploitation of natural resources is the cornerstone of every attempt to hold the Occupying Power and its organs accountable for illegal exploitation. As this paper sought to demonstrate, it is important to make a distinction between two different situations: illegal exploitation may be carried out by the Occupying Power's organs (either de jure and de facto), or by private actors. In the first case, the Occupying Power may be held directly responsible for violations of the international humanitarian law rules regarding the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory, and its organs individually may face international criminal prosecution for those conduct.
In contrast, when the illegal exploitation is carried out by private actors, the Occupying Power may be held responsible only for not having prevented that illegal exploitation on the basis of a duty of vigilance pursuant to Article 43 HR, according to which the territorial control gained manu militari demands that the Occupying Power prevent individuals that are in the occupied territory from illegally exploiting the natural resources present therein. This responsibility is vested in the Occupying Power because international law always considers internationally responsible for acts of private actors those states that exercise governmental functions over the territory where those actors carry out their activity -irrespective of any legal title at the basis of this exercise. However, since this duty of vigilance is an obligation of conduct, illegal exploitation by private actors triggers the Occupying Power's international responsibility only if the state fails to demonstrate that it had exercised its powers in order to prevent that illegal conduct. When the exploitation of natural resources is carried out by private actors, the Occupying Power's organs who failed in their 115 The International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg has envisaged the possibility of prosecuting private actors for war crimes such as companies and corporations. On this topic, see Marston Danner (2006); Jessberger (2010) . vigilance may not be held responsible individually for war crimes since a serious violation of Article 43 HR is not considered to be a war crime by any international criminal justice instrument.
In light of the above, it is clear that, today, the law of belligerent occupation must take into consideration even private actors, and not only the Occupying Power, the ousted sovereign, and the population of the occupied territory, which are the traditional stakeholders during occupations. This proliferation of actors involved in the occupation further complicates the individuation of the relevant international norms and path of state and individual accountability.
